This paper looks at citizen assembly-style constitutional conventions as a path towards revitalising representative democratic institutions. Such conventions were notoriously set up in British Columbia, The Netherlands, Ontario, Iceland and Ireland; the Scottish Government promised one for an independent Scotland, and calls for a United Kingdom-wide convention remain strong following the Scottish referendum. The assumption behind such calls has been that direct citizen engagement in constitutional revision processes will supplement or even replace traditional political institutions and thereby invigorate democracy. Involving the people in constitution-drafting, the argument goes, actualises the hitherto mythical 'people' and turns self-government into an empirical reality.
Introduction
This paper looks at the turn towards participation in constitution-making, including in the United Kingdom (UK) following the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. The highly participatory and deliberative nature of the referendum resulted in it being called a successful exercise in direct democracy, 1 with one author arguing that it 'is likely to lead to greater demand for the use of direct democracy in processes of constitutional change' .
2 Alongside more use of the referendum, including on European Union (EU) membership, 3 the UK constitutional landscape may yet be enriched with another participatory mechanism: a citizen assembly-style constitutional convention.
Understood generically as a 'representative body collected together to discuss constitutional change' , 4 constitutional conventions have received increased scholarly and practical attention. They promise greater legitimacy and longevity of the constitutional agreement they produce, as well as democratic renewal. If a 'new model of democracy' is indeed emerging as some have argued, one that requires more from its citizens, 5 then constitutional conventions are an embodiment of this innovation.
Cheryl Saunders has argued that 'there is now, effectively, universal acceptance that the authority for a Constitution must derive, in one way or another, from the people of the state concerned' . 6 She has argued that we may broadly identify a trend 'towards openness, inclusivity and the active involvement of the people of a state at all stages of the process through participation, rather than mere consultation' . 7 Others have echoed this view, 8 even going so far as to identify a right to participate in democratic governance,
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which extends to constitution-making, in international law. 9 Examples of this trend have included the rise in recourse to constitutional referendums-referendums which bring to the voting public questions of constitutional significance. 10 Scotland and Catalonia are only the most recent and visible examples of what has been called Europe entering the 'age of referendums ' . 11 When it comes to experiments with deliberative mini-publics, understood as 'forums, usually organised by policy-makers, where citizens representing different viewpoints are gathered together to deliberate on a particular issue in small-N groups' , 12 British Columbia, The Netherlands and Ontario are prominent first examples. British Columbia in particular was a ground-breaking experiment with a citizen assembly, sparking a 'demonstration effect' in the other two 13 and, subsequently, in Iceland and Ireland.
14 These earlier examples were all aimed at effecting electoral reform and not far-reaching constitutional change. Nevertheless, they also shared a commitment to participatory and deliberative democracy aimed at 'inject[ing] some popular legitimacy into policymaking' . 15 Participatory mechanisms of constitutional change have also been linked to the crisis of democracy generally, and of representative democracy in particular. In an age where citizens feel detached from regular politics, participatory and deliberative forms of engagement may yet resurrect their interest. Perhaps it is not unrelated that these mechanisms have been called for in the aftermath of economic crises (as in Iceland and Ireland) or of 'once in a generation' decisions (as in Scotland). The advantages promised by participatory and deliberative institutions-creativity, openness and consensus-based (rather than adversarial) politics among them-are that much more attractive when confronted with constitutional failure and stale institutions.
Similar arguments have been made in the UK context. Calls for a UK constitutional convention have gained momentum in the aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum and seem closer than ever to gaining political traction. A careful analysis of what employing such a mechanism to achieve constitutional reform in Britain would entail is thus essential. This paper proceeds by, first, outlining the types of proposals hitherto on the table. It then explores three potentially controversial areas which require delineation before such a convention can be set up: ensuring its legitimacy, explored here from the point of view of its capacity to represent the relevant political community; entrusting it with a clear substantive mandate; and avoiding the alienation of political institutions. While these three aspects are here labelled as 'challenges' , my aim is not to negate the potential benefits of constitutional conventions. Nor am I putting forth a defence of representative democracy in the face of participatory challenges. Instead, I wish to raise key questions which need to be asked before a participatory instrument is set up in the UK. In doing so, I apply a comparative lens to arguments in favour of a UK constitutional convention, which helps illustrate that much more thought needs to be given before taking such a step.
Calls for a UK constitutional convention
At the same time as the British constitution has been said to be in crisis, 16 calls for one or more constitutional convention(s) in the UK have grown louder. Such calls are not new, 17 but they have been reinvigorated in recent years. The issue was discussed in a March 2013 Report of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the UK Parliament entitled 'Do We Need a Constitutional Convention for the UK?' . 18 The Report recommended that the government consider establishing a constitutional convention with a clear remit, popular participation, involvement of politicians and a timetable of one to two years. However, its recommendations were not unanimous and the resolution of the English Question 19 featured as the priority, preceding any such wider convention. Models considered were the Philadelphia Convention, the Scottish Constitutional Convention, Iceland, and British Columbia. In 2014, the Committee again considered a constitutional convention as one of the institutional options available to draft 'a new Magna Carta' , 20 and by 2015 more confidently declared that '[p]erhaps the "constitutional moment", which in quieter times some believed was a prerequisite for change, is now close at hand' .
Talk of a constitutional convention was prominent in the run-up to the Scottish referendum, with the Scottish Government pledging one tasked with the aim of drafting a constitution for an independent Scotland. Both the November Notably missing among these were Conservative voices. This is perhaps less surprising when considering that the Government's response to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee's report on the matter had been to reject the timeliness of setting up a constitutional convention due to competing economic priorities and the lack of public appetite.
30 David Cameron's post-referendum speech mentioned the need for 'wider civic engagement' but made no direct reference to a convention. Instead, he brought up the need to deal with the 'English votes for English laws' as central to any constitutional reform. 31 The same concern was at the core of the December 2014 policy paper addressing devolution in England. 32 The latter also briefly touched on the prospect of a constitutional convention, emphasising the need for decisions on its terms of reference and scope; its composition; timescales; and how it would interact with parallel changes taking place, notably devolution in Scotland. 33 But whereas the Liberal Democrats reiterated their desire that such a body 'should be legislated on at the earliest possible opportunity so its work can start as soon as possible' , 34 the Conservative stance remained non-committal.
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A similar momentum has been growing in civil society 36 and academic circles, 37 and was particularly strong around the time of the Scottish independence referendum. Academic discussions have revolved around whether a constitutional convention is opportune; the various types of conventions one could opt for; the best model to emulate; and the issues it should be entrusted with. 38 Scholarly opinion is split on whether a constitutional convention would be the best way to achieve the constitutional reform most agree is needed. Some have pointed to 'the accumulation of unresolved constitutional problems' as creating a strong case for a convention with popular participation and tasked with considering the constitution as a whole. 39 Others, however, have preferred alternative bodies similarly tasked, assuming public apathy and governmental resource shortage. 40 Even those taking the constitutional convention option seriously point to past failures in pan-UK constitutional renovation as cause for pessimism. 41 What emerges, thus, is a mixed picture. While few would dispute the need for serious thought on Britain's constitution in light of recent changes, the process by which this is to be achieved has been more controversial. Even the aims attached to this process have varied. They have included: seizing the referendum moment, with a desire to channel popular energy into concrete change; fixing the perceived inadequacy of current mechanisms to achieve such change; correlating the type of mechanism to the scale and holistic nature of the constitutional overhaul; as well as the desire for genuine democratic innovation and a willingness to experiment in order to achieve it. However, there is a real risk of instrumentalisation, with the convention being manipulated by political parties wishing to see their own agendas reflected in its mandate and outcomes. Moreover, occasionally arguments for a UK constitutional convention have been combined with those for a written constitution for the country, which unhelpfully mixes two very different avenues of constitutional debate.
Constitutional conventions have been discussed as one possible mechanism for effectuating the needed change, with their advocates believing such a convention to be the only way to achieve both comprehensive constitutional change and democratic legitimacy. The normative assumption behind such arguments has been that direct citizen engagement in constitutional revision processes can supplement or even replace traditional political institutions and thereby invigorate democracy. Involving the people in constitution-drafting, the argument would go, actualises the hitherto mythical 'people' and turns self-government into an empirical reality. In what follows, I scrutinise this assumption with reference to the UK context in comparative perspective. My aim will not be to debate whether a constitutional convention is adequate for UK constitutional reform today or not. Rather, I am interested in the UK case as a potential testing ground for participatory democracy and in the distinct challenges it poses to the promise of constitutional conventions more specifically.
A UK constitutional convention: Three challenges
Fundamental constitutional change needs to be, or at least to be perceived as, legitimate if it is to take root. This is even truer in the UK considering the scale and scope of the reforms said to be needed in order to give coherence to the British constitution. Several authors have discussed the prospect of a UK constitutional convention as needing to 'command[] such legitimacy that it would be able to create a new "rule of recognition" supplanting notions of parliamentary "sovereignty"' . 42 The notion that '[f]or the outcome to be legitimate so must be the process' 43 is widespread in constitution-making scholarship today. To quote Saunders again:
Process can underpin the legitimacy of a Constitution, increase public knowledge of it, instil a sense of public ownership and create an expectation that the Constitution will be observed, in spirit as well as form. A constitution-making process may assist to set the tone for ordinary politics, including the peaceful transfer of power in accordance with constitutional rules. 44 In other words, there is an educational element involved in having a constitutionmaking process perceived as legitimate, as it can serve as model for subsequent political interactions. There is also a link to public ownership and increased vigilance: an informed public will know when the constitution has been transgressed and demand accountability.
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I have suggested elsewhere five principles of participatory constitution-making good practice, on the basis of lessons drawn comparatively (mainly from Iceland and Ireland). 46 These five principles were: (1) inclusiveness, aimed at ensuring the process is representative and responsive at all stages; (2) clarity of process, achieved via advance notice of the steps of the process and its outcome; (3) the involvement of all relevant actors, so as to avoid alienation and to ensure public and political ownership of the process (I discuss this in greater detail below); (4) equality as parity of esteem, referring to responsive and transparent decision-making procedures; and (5) consensus- based decision-making, aimed at avoiding the mere aggregation of preferences and at facilitating true deliberation. 47 These types of considerations would be equally relevant to a UK constitutional convention, which would, like its predecessors, also face complex decisions over inclusiveness, clarity of mandate, allocated resources, working methods and how to define its success. Of these, I will focus on inclusiveness in the first section below and on mandate in the following section. My choice relates to the centrality of these two questions for the legitimacy of any participatory body set up to effect constitutional change, but also to their elusiveness in the literature on a British constitutional convention. Moreover, while other aspects such as budgets, timeframes or terms of reference may be resolved at the stroke of a governmental pen, the inclusiveness and mandate questions pose fundamental problems which require more careful theoretical consideration.
The inclusiveness challenge
When discussing the need for a UK constitutional convention to be inclusive, the question immediately arises: what is the relevant political community which this convention would be tasked with representing? Those writing on this topic, whether academics or politicians, have given rather different answers and have discussed a convention for the UK as a whole, Scotland only, the rest of the UK minus Scotland, or even England alone. These disagreements are not inconsequential: path dependence theory tells us that subsequent decisions will be constrained by initial ones. 48 Thus, whether an English preconvention is to be established, as the current government has at various times suggested, is a decision the outcome of which could influence the parameters of a wider convention, if the latter would still be held at all.
Moreover, we must remember that a UK constitutional convention would be concerned with constitutional change, including in the form of further devolution of powers from the centre to a unit, in the context of a multi-level, plurinational, asymmetrical system. 49 Thus, whatever lessons are sought from comparative work need to be measured against and adapted to the UK's distinct context. As noted above, the comparators most often invoked have consistently been small countries, or sub-units of a federal state, and most have relatively homogenous populations. Thus, achieving inclusiveness may have been difficult but manageable in places like Iceland or Ireland, but would certainly prove even more complex in the UK. The latter would at the very least add another, territorial, layer to considerations of representativeness. As of yet, there are no adequate comparators for the accommodation of such territorial diversity in the composition of a citizen assembly-style constitutional convention. While there is some evidence that participatory mechanisms can be scaled up in federal systems, 50 there remain many unanswered questions as to their suitability to one constitutional context or another. Given that the most recurrent theme in criticism of the Smith Commission process has had to do with precisely achieving a coherent reform of the territorial constitution, this is not an issue to be cast aside lightly. Even if the issue of the relevant political community were to be resolved, the inclusiveness requirement would still need to be addressed at the level of individual convention member selection. Proponents of a UK constitutional convention have tended to agree that it would comprise representatives of civil society, political actors, and individual members of the public, whether directly elected or randomly selected. Again, comparisons here have tended to focus on Ireland in particular, which included citizens as well as politicians in equal proportion (civil society organisations, though invited to submit proposals, were not directly represented in the convention itself), selected quasi-randomly, ie adjusted for gender, geography and age. While that model could be emulated in the British case, it bears noting that it was itself contested in the Irish context. Civil society organisations in particular lamented their exclusion from actual deliberations. 51 The fear related to statistical notions of representativeness is that, in its attempt to mirror society at large, it fails to ensure that minority voices are also included. In a constitution-making context, where majoritarian usurpation could have dire consequences, silencing minorities via non-inclusion in the body drafting the constitution might bear a heavy price.
A separate point concerns timing. It may seem a trivial observation, but a UK constitutional convention would come in the aftermath of (and possibly spurred by) the Scottish independence referendum, with its high turnout, closer than anticipated result and distorted meaning of the 'no' vote (to mean more devolution rather than closure). Some have suggested that what has ensued has been a 'chain reaction (…) which has transformed the seemingly straightforward "yes/no" of the Scottish referendum into something more complex and unpredictable that spills over across the UK's internal boundaries' . 52 Interpreting a relatively narrow 'no' vote is difficult and potentially speculative, but it is not meaningless. It is true that 'the constitutional debate looks completely different once the threat of independence drops out of the equation' , suggesting that even constitutional amendments which fail at the ratification stage may, by providing evidence of growing national consensus, amount to de facto constitutional change. 54 Expectations differ because our constitutional imagination has been enriched. What this means for the inclusiveness requirement of a UK constitutional convention is that what would have seemed legitimate before may now no longer suffice. Who sits at the table is determined by who wields influence, and the Scottish referendum may have tilted the scale in this regard irreversibly. Similarly, the results of the 2015 general election have redrawn the parameters of any future decision to set up a constitutional convention, with Scotland's voice now even more difficult to ignore in the process of UK-wide constitutional reform.
The mandate challenge
No less controversial may prove to be the question of what mandate a UK constitutional convention would have. The scope of its remit would need to be clearly set out before the convention started its work so as to ensure that the process was seen as legitimate and the 'rules of the game' were known to all. Such clarity would also help prevent abuse or the later delegitimising of the convention's work. Similar calls have been made with reference to the increased use of referendums in the UK, whose 'lack of regulation has opened up the potential for [their] manipulation' . 55 Others have echoed this need for codification irrespective of the type of process or set of procedures resorted to for constitutional change.
56 Indeed, we may be witnessing the realisation of a perceptive observation made almost two decades ago, namely, that it may be 'that in the future, constitutional amendment will become a more controlled process, with greater constraints on the government being exercised not only by Parliament and the courts, but also by the people' . 57 The need for a clear mandate for a constitutional convention would be part of that increased control, but also a logical requirement: an unclear process would be unlikely to achieve clarification of the UK constitution.
More contentious would be to set out the content of a UK convention's mandate. As already noted, one of the criticisms levied against the Smith Commission process was that its limited remit meant it could not adequately address the need for a coherent territorial constitution. 58 There was a sense, after the Scottish referendum, that a more profound (re)thinking of the substantive content of the UK constitution was needed, and that the Smith Commission was not adequate to achieve it. 59 (Such fundamental rethinking of the UK constitution had been demanded for some time, with authors warning that the centrifugal dynamics of devolution required a 'sustained attempt to review and renew the purposes of union. ') 60 If it is to avoid such criticism, therefore, a constitutional convention would need to have a mandate that was not only clear and manageable, but also sufficiently ambitious so as to provide the answers the Smith Commission could not and to warrant the investment in its work.
Options for the scope of the convention's mandate include for it to produce a written constitution or merely to make recommendations on discrete issues. The latter may result in the same type of piecemeal constitutional reform that advocates of a constitutional convention have deplored in the past. Nevertheless, it is precisely what the Irish constitutional convention, the model most often invoked in the UK context, was entrusted to do. In Ireland, the convention was called on to make recommendations on seven issues, to which it added two more based on public input. In fact, the Irish process' relative success, and avoidance of any blockages, has been attributed by some to precisely this sequencing of its work. 61 Most of the other instances of constitutional conventions invoked as models (British Columbia, The Netherlands and Ontario) similarly dealt with isolated issues of electoral reform. The sole exception was Iceland, whose convention had a full constitutional project to deliver. This list shows some promise for far-reaching reform being possible via constitutional convention, but there is still no direct model for the type of territorial reallocation of powers the UK would seek.
A last observation here refers to the lack of unanimity with regard to the need for a written constitution in the UK. 62 While the fervour of writings on a constitutional convention for the UK would seem to indicate agreement on this issue, there are still prominent voices which hold such a development not to be essential. 63 Such disagreements raise the broader question of the type of document the constitutional convention would be tasked to prepare. I have been writing on the assumption that it would be a substantive identification and reimagining of core constitutional tenets and not a purely technical exercise in codifying existing rules. As others have noted, such a technical endeavour would be better suited for professionals; a 'written constitution proper' would instead 'be more intensive and complex than a non-legal Code or Consolidation Bill, as it would symbolically become the Constitution in the state, providing the basic law and primary source of authority in the United Kingdom' . 64 
The exceptionality challenge
Finally, one must remember that the high costs of popular constitution-making, including in terms of political will and citizen interest, will unavoidably render constitutional conventions exceptional. The majority of constitutional reforms are bound to come about via more traditional channels. This is especially true of the UK, where almost all major constitutional change 'needs to be formulated and presented to Parliament by the government of the day' . 65 Thus, focusing solely on popular involvement in times of crisis may be short-sighted and ultimately detrimental. If democracy is a work in progress, it is still representative democracy that we are working towards improving, including via boosts of participatory activity. The question then becomes how best to balance, or integrate, the two types of processes-the participatory and the representative democratic-in such a way as to have them reinforce each other's strengths. How to do this in the British context where, as Dawn Oliver has observed, democracy 'is a slippery term, and one about which UK politicians are rather coy' , 66 may prove even more challenging.
Paradoxically, the UK has had experience with both a highly participatory event, the Scottish independence referendum, and a more conventionally political one, the Smith Commission, within the same year. While the former was lauded as ultimately a good example of a participatory process, 67 the latter was received with much unease. The procedurally problematic aspects of the Smith Commission were in fact commented upon soon after it was set up. 68 They included the fact that the Smith Commission process was distinctly elite-driven, having been initiated by political elites but also because, outside of a month-long period during which it gathered proposals from citizens and civil society, it was only open to political parties. Unsurprisingly, the parties' submissions to the Commission largely reflected previously expressed positions. 69 However, the Commission's broader outreach efforts were not insignificant: despite the tight timeline, it received 407 submissions from civic institutions, organisations and groups, and 18,381 from members of the public. 70 And, while its final report has been criticised for failing-due to the Commission's limited remit rather than anything else-to consider the wider and longer term impact of its proposals for the Union as a whole, 71 the Smith Commission process itself was more in line with UK constitutional practice than the independence referendum had been.
To this descriptive point-that British constitutional tradition favours piecemeal reform through political channels rather than revolutionary change through participatory processes-I wish to add two further points, which build on comparative insights. One is that it is not at all clear that all constitutional crises are best resolved via recourse to the people. Jon Elster, for instance, has advocated for constitution-making processes to contain both elements of secrecy and of publicity due to their disparate strengths and drawbacks, as '[w]ith total secrecy partisan interests and logrolling come to the forefront, whereas full publicity encourages grandstanding and rhetorical overbidding' .
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To uncritically advocate for popular involvement in constitutional change is thus to take for granted that anything imbued with the participatory aura will be better and more legitimate than politically-negotiated products. Concerns over popular expertise and interest are relevant here, alongside the shortcomings of publicity when seeking delicate compromise.
With regard to the assumed lack of the public's expertise, sceptics would do well to consider the British Columbia, Ontario and Netherlands citizen assemblies tasked with the complex and technical matter of electoral reform. In spite of this technical nature of their mandate, those involved succeeded not only in understanding the various options available to them, but also in deliberating upon the best alternative for their polity. However, these assemblies only worked in the context of ample time allocated for learning and deliberation (for example, a full year for the learning phase in British Columbia, and another year for its deliberative work). All three of their proposals Parties-Proposals.aspx> accessed 10 July 2015, which raises questions about the appropriateness of the Smith Commission process, its outcome and aftermath. eventually failed due to a lack of popular interest, the two Canadian ones via popular referendums which did not meet the necessary thresholds, and the Dutch due to political changes which deprived the assembly of its support.
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In the context of the UK, we may well wonder whether the kind of complicated financial and monetary policy arrangements which came under the remit of the Smith Commission were ever really going to be decided otherwise than via political negotiations. Even commentators critical of the Smith Commission process have contrasted the further devolution debates to the buoyant independence referendum ones, calling the former 'deadly dull'; 74 'a long trudge through closed committees and impenetrable reports'; 75 and something to at best 'muddl[e] through' . 76 This is not to say public input and oversight was not desirable in the process, but that the minutiae of negotiation were likely never truly going to escape elite hands.
Of course, this only addresses the problem of technical constitutional change and its public palatability. Most advocates of a constitutional convention for the UK link it to a need to (re)consider fundamental values and principles of the British constitution, the scale of which only a broad public debate can achieve. My answer to this is to caution against alienating political elites, which bears a heavy price in any process of constitutional change. Here, again, comparative insights may suggest that we temper our optimism for a participatory approach.
Iceland's experiment with a constitutional convention in the aftermath of the country's economic collapse in 2008 may serve as a warning tale. Despite the clamour with which the draft constitution produced by the convention was received, and notwithstanding a successful referendum which approved it, the text never came into force. The Parliament failed to discuss the bill a third and necessary time in 2013, and the new constitution dropped from amidst priorities in the general election that same year. A new procedure to amend the existing constitution by 2017 was instead proposed, and thus the 'world's first crowdsourced constitution (…) ultimately fell at the final hurdle' . 77 Iceland's failure to adopt the popularly produced constitutional draft had a lot to do with the late involvement of political elites, which as a consequence felt alienated from the process. 78 for effecting constitutional change, at least in the UK. Recent experiments with popular mechanisms such as constitutional conventions are exceptional. Their success, partial at best, has had much to do with the degree to which political actors were engaged in the process alongside the citizenry. Thus, while a trend towards more direct democracy may be afoot, including in the UK, it would be a mistake to embrace the participatory promise at the expense of, rather than alongside, representative institutions.
Conclusion
The choice of mechanism to decide on and enact constitutional change is nowhere an easy one. The recent turn in constitution-making scholarship in favour of participatory approaches, including advocacy for mechanisms such as constitutional conventions which involve the citizens directly in deliberations, has much persuasive force. Indeed, who could resist the promise of better decisions taken in a more legitimate manner and resulting in a long-lasting constitutional settlement? As I have tried to show in this paper, however, the evidence for the success of such mechanisms is still incomplete. Their promise of increased legitimacy for and greater public ownership over constitutional reform coexists with the risk that 'politics as usual' will take over before participatory constitution-making can deliver.
Comparative work inspires cautious hope, however. Despite their failings, the Icelandic and Irish processes in particular have shown that expanding constitutionmaking beyond elites can yield workable results. These same cases also serve as cautionary tales on the importance of clear and thorough planning and implementation of constitutional change initiatives. Nevertheless, these two experiments indicate that, under the right conditions, the public can fruitfully be at the centre of a constitutional reform process. Some of these conditions, such as economic crises as triggers for constitutional overhaul, cannot easily be replicated elsewhere. Others-such as growing dissatisfaction with the current constitutional settlement, a sense of the inadequacy of traditional reform channels, and a genuine willingness to bring the people closer to their constitution-are more familiar, including to a UK audience.
As I have argued throughout this article, UK political and academic debates took just such a pro-participatory turn around the time of the Scottish independence referendum. Constitutional conventions inspired by comparative experiences were soon discussed as an option, having both strong advocates and also detractors. At the very least, I have argued, policy makers and academics in the UK who support such an instrument must answer the three challenges raised above. Any UK constitutional convention would need to have from the outset: legitimacy in the form of inclusiveness, both at the level of individual members and of the territorial unit(s) represented; a clear mandate, likely to go beyond the merely technical codification of existing constitutional rules and into substantive rethinking of the constitution; and a link to the political process to ensure
